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COMPARISON OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINE POLITICAL
SYSTEMS
By SEGUNDO V. LINARES QUINTANA t
While the following article was in the process of publication, a
Constitutional Convention of 169 members adopted a new Constitu-
tion for the Argentine Republic; however, the significant changes
effected by this new Constitution indicate that the problems raised
herein are still germane.
This new Constitution is made up of 103 Articles and one Tem-
porary Article, as compared with the 110 Articles of the old Consti-
tution. It shows a decided tendency to recognize the advancement of
the social and economic rights of all the people, as indicated by the
Articles concerning the rights of workmen and the family, of educa-
tion and culture for all, and the determination of the social functions
of property. Among the most significant changes are the provisions
permitting the re-election of the President and Vice-President for more
than one term of six years, and for the election of Senators and Depu-
ties for terms of six years. Another major innovation of particular
interest is the provision extending Argentine citizenship automatically
to all foreigners who have resided in Argentina five years unless the
foreigner signifies in writing his intention not to become a citizen.
The whole spirit of this new Constitution is presumably expressed
in the amendment to the Preamble, which adds, after setting forth
the purposes of "confirming justice, consolidating domestic peace, pro-
viding for the common defense, promoting the general welfare . .,"
the language: ". . . ratifying the inexorable decision to constitute
a nation, socially just, economically free and politically sover-
eign.
Where pertinent, comment has been inserted to indicate the
changes which have been effected by the new Constitution.-ED.
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THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Influence of the Constitution of the United States on the Constitution
of the Argentine Republic
When Doctor NicolAs A. Calvo published the Spanish version
of Story's Commentary on the Constitution of the United States in
1860, he stated that his translation was to serve so that his com-
patriots "might become aware of the value of the Argentine federal
Constitution, which has been copied from the United States Consti-
tution; and which has no defects except precisely in those points in
which it ceases to be a copy." 1
The validity of such a categorical assertion should be examined.
In support there could immediately be cited expressions of the repre-
sentatives to the Constitutional Congress of 1853,2 and the minutes
of the declaration which the Congress itself approved.' But the ques-
tion has resulted in a strenuous and impassioned controversy between
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi, two of
the greatest thinkers Argentina has ever produced. The former main-
tains that the preamble to the American Constitution was adopted
literally, with the result that "American constitutional law, the doc-
trine of its statesmen, the declarations of its courts, the customary
practice in identical or analogous questions have the force of authority
in the Argentine Republic. . . ." 4 On the other hand, Alberdi,
who has acquired the title of Father of the Constitution because of the
profound influence his ideas had on the Constitutional Congress of
1853, states that "everything is different in the two constitutions
• even though the federal form which is common to both, makes
them appear similar to the eyes of the inattentive and superficial ob-
server." He then goes on to point out that to compare the funda-
mental Argentine law with that of the United States is but to "falsify
and bastardize" the former.'
The truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes. It
is not conceivable that the Argentine Constitution is a mere servile
copy of the United States Constitution, but neither is it correct to say
1. 1 CALVO, JOHN STORY, COMENTARIO SOBRE LA CoNsTITUcI6N FEDERAL DE LOS
ESTADOS UNiDos 2 (1888). (Emphasis added.)
2. See remarks of Representatives Gorostiaga and Gutierres, REPOBLICA ARGEN-
TINA, CONVENcI6N NACIONAL DE 1898 Y ANTECEDENTES; CONGRESO CONSTITUYENTE DE
1853 Y CONVENCIONES REFORMADORAS DE 1860 Y 1866 at 270, 283 (1898).
3. Id. at 369.
4. SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS DE LA CONSTITUCI6N DE LA CONFEDERACI6N ARGEN-
TNA 54 (1929).
5. AIBERDi, BASES Y COMENTARIOS A LA CONsTITUcI6N ARGENTINA 335, 346
(1929).
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that the admirable code of the United States has not had a profound
influence on the instrument of government of Argentina. Argentine
scholars, including J. N. Matienzo,6 Joaquin V. GonzAlez, Juan A.
GonzAlez Calder6n 8 Alberto Padilla,' and American authorities as
well, viz., Dowling"0 and MacDonald," subscribe to this middle-of-
the-road view.
In reality the Argentine Constitution is not a copy or imitation
of that of the United States, nor is it the miraculous result of inspira-
tion. It is the product of years of struggle and sacrifice, created
laboriously through the efforts of generations of Argentines. Each
one of its articles, each one of its clauses, each one of its words, has
deep roots in the history of the nation. But the members of the Santa
Fe Congress of 1853, in addition to national antecedents and char-
acteristics, took into consideration the conclusions of political science
and comparative constitutional law, and above all, the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, which served and still serves
as a model for federal republics, and the adoption of which marked
the beginning of a new era in political science. It would not be an
exaggeration to say that the instrument of government drafted at
Philadelphia, like the polar star which directs navigation, has been
the compulsory force point of the democratic peoples of the world.12
It seems perfectly clear, therefore, that the Fathers of the Argentine
Constitution took as a mould or model the American Constitution, tak-
ing into consideration at the same time the antecedents and peculiari-
ties of their country in order to produce a praiseworthy instrument
of government, the value of which made the Italian jurist, Victor M.
Orlando, say that it would seem that the Argentine drafters acted as
if inspired by God.3
6. See MATIENZO, EL GOIENO EPRESENTATIVO mERA, 86 (1910).
7. See 1 GoNzAi.z, EsTtmios coNsTrrucioxAmLs 11 (1930).
8. See 1 CALDER6x, DEaRcHo CONsTiTucioNAL 422 (1931).
9. PADILLA, LA CoNSTiTUCI6N DE EsTAwOs UNIDoS COO PRECEDENTE ARGENTINO
8 (1921).
10. Dowling, Paralelos constitutionales entre la Argentina y los Estados Unidos,
22 REVISTA ARGENTINA JnunICA, LA LEY [hereinafter REV. LA LEY] 1 (Argentina
1941).
11. MAcDoNALD, GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE RPUBLIC 128 (1942).
12. Compare the remarks in 1 Nrrm, LA DEmoCRAcrA 43 (Almela & Vives ed.
1932); Viamonte, La Revoluci6n Norteaericana y Ia Revoluci&n Francesca, La
Naci6n, Sept. 5, 1948, § 2, p. 1. It should be noted that the report of the Commission
studying the Argentine Constitution of 1860 appraised the Constitution of the UnitedStates as "the only one which has authority throughout the world." DaaO DE
SESIONEs BE A CoNEcI6N DEL EsTo DE Bu~aos AMS ENCARGADA DEL EXAM
DE LA CoisTICI6N FEmuL 95 (1860).
13. Orlando, Cardcter de la Constituci&n Argentina, 18 REVISTA DE LEGISLACI6N
Y JuRisPRJDENcrA [hereinafter REV. JUR. ARGENTINA] 121 (1921).
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Comparison of the Text of the United States and Argentine
Constitutions
A comparison of the two constitutions shows that forty-four sec-
tions of the two are practically identical, twenty-two are similar, forty-
one are different, and sixty sections of the Argentine Constitution
are not found in the American.' 4
A detailed and impartial comparison evidences great and funda-
mental similarities, manifestly due to the use of the American Con-
stitution as a model. With complete accuracy Professor MacDonald
states, ". . . when an American visitor examines for the first time
the Argentine Constitution he receives a certain surprise, the surprise
of a person who has traveled many thousands of miles from his land,
only to discover the smiling face of an old friend. The declaration
of rights formulates the same guarantees of individual liberty which
have been known for so long by generations of Americans and which
the English people enjoyed even much earlier. The powers of the
President and of the Congress, the relation between the nation and
the provinces, the organization and functioning of the courts, as these
matters are established in the fundamental Argentine law all carry
the indelible stamp of the authors of the American Constitution of
1787." '5
It has been averred that the law of the United States is based on
four cardinal principles:
(A) Representative government-the determination of legisla-
tion by representatives elected by the people, and not by the
people themselves;
(B) Dual government-the concept that each American citizen
is a citizen both of his respective state and of the central
government within their respective spheres;
(C) Guarantee of individual liberty-the limitations on the
public powers;
(D) Independent judicial power-the inability of the other
branches of the government to exercise dominance over the
judiciary.Y0
14. For a detailed comparison of the sections appearing mutually and individually
in the two constitutions, see ViAmONTE, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUcIONAL 355-
361 (1944). In this work is included the text of the Argentine Constitution, in which
appear in italics the parts that are not in the United States Constitution. Id. at 362-380.
15. MacDonald, Inpresiones de im estudio norteamericato de ciencia politico
sobre el gobierno argentino, 26 Rlv. LA LEY 947 (1942).
16. MARSH, EL CANON AMERICANO 62 (1941).
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Chief Justice Marshall's statement that "the government of the United
States is a government of laws and not of men" summarizes the whole
political philosophy of the American Constitution. And the Argentine
Constitution, even though it may differ in detail, has been built on
identical foundations, and is inspired by the same political philosophy.
But this does not import a denial of the deep differences which
exist in the details of the architecture of the two instruments. For
example, the Argentine law inclines toward more federal power, as
opposed to state power, than the United States, from which it follows
that the states of the United States enjoy a greater self-government
than the provinces of Argentina. Moreover, in Argentina the execu-
tive appears to be vested with more powers than are granted the Amer-
ican President. On the other hand, the Argentine Constitution pro-
vides for the handling of the relations between the President and the
Congress, an aspect which the American Constitution does not treat in
detail. It will occasion no surprise, also, to point out that the United
States Congress enjoys greater powers than the corresponding Argen-
tine body.
With respect to individual liberty, both constitutions demonstrate
a special concern, it being worthy of note that in the United States,
the most powerful weapon for this preservation, the writ of habeas
corpus, is suspended in national emergencies. In the Argentine
Republic the equivalent situation is the declaration of the state of
siege, the effect of which is to suspend individual guarantees.
THE CONSTITUTION IN PRACTICE
Individual Rights
Both constitutions contain, implicit in every clause, the funda-
mental thesis that individual liberty is the raigon-d'etre of the state.
The preamble to the Argentine Constitution proclaims:
We the representatives of the people of the Argentine nation,
in General Constitutional Congress assembled, by the will and
election of the Provinces which compose it; in fulfillment of pre-
existing pacts; for the purpose of . . . insuring the blessings
of liberty for ourselves, our posterity, and for all the men of the
world who wish to live on Argentine soil, invoking the protection
of God, the fount of all reason and justice, do ordain, decree and
establish this Constitution for the Argentine Nation.
The Argentine Supreme Court has decided that civil liberty is
the end towards which constitutional government is aimed, political
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liberty being the means by which this end is to be achieved. In a
memorable opinion, the court stated:
• . . the conjoint activity that would contradict the norms of
social or personal morality or that could try to suppress the in-
dividual liberties insured to the inhabitants of the Republic by the
first chapter of our fundamental Charter, and without the exercise
of which man would be disqualified to perform with dignity his
mission on this earth, would not be consistent with the legal char-
acter indicated; or, finally, that which would conspire against
political liberty, because having been granted as the only means
to insure civil liberty, in the long run the disappearance of the
former will bring forth the enslavement of the latter."'
The Argentine drafters profited from the experience of the Phila-
delphia representatives and included a bill of rights in the Constitution
itself, thus avoiding the problems of amendment and approval which
confronted the American Constitution. It is of interest to contrast
the bill of rights in the two constitutions. The American bill is ob-
ligatory only on the federal government,'8 and lacks the proper force
to limit state powers.' 9 The guarantees of the bill of rights are limited
to the territory of the country, unincorporated territories being ex-
cluded unless fundamental rights are involved, in which case it is for
the Supreme Court to determine what rights possess such character.2"
On the other hand, the Argentine declaration of rights has full force
in the whole national territory, both for the central government and
the provincial governments for all inhabitants without exception. The
provinces, upon accepting their constitutions, are obliged to do so in
"accordance with the principles, declarations, and guarantees of the
National Constitution." 21
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall deny to any person "the equal protection
of the laws." Article Sixteen of the Argentine Constitution provides
that ". . . the Argentine Nation does not admit prerogatives of
blood or birth; there are not then any personal privileges or titles of
nobility. All its inhabitants are equal before the law "1a and admissible
17. In re Spagnuolo, 191 Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n
[hereinafter C. S. N.] 388 (Argentina 1941).
18. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697
(1931). It must be noted that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a limitation on
the power of the states similar to the limitations imposed on the federal government
by the Fifth Amendment.
20. Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S.
244 (1901).
21. Hileret y Rodriguez v. Provincia de Tucumin, 98 C. S. N. 20, 39 (1903).
21a. Article Sixteen of the new Constitution adds, "The Nation of Argentina
admits no racial separation or segregation."
COMPARISON OF U. S. AND ARGENTINE POLITICAL SYSTEMS 647
in positions without any other condition than competency." Equality
is the basis of taxation and public charges."
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed many times that this section
is to be read literally and that no privilege or exception may be estab-
lished which operates for the benefit of a few. 2 With special refer-
ence to taxes, the Court has laid down as the test of equality, that of
equal burden upon the taxpayers in analogous circumstances, but has
qualified this with the allowance of ample latitude to classify reason-
ably for taxation, holding that arbitrary taxation is unconstitutional.23
The Argentine Constitution differs from the American freedom
of religion provision in that the Catholic Church is given a preferen-
tial status, by virtue of the fact that the government maintains the
Catholic Church, and the President must be a Catholic. However,
freedom of religion is guaranteed under Article Nineteen which states
that ". . . private actions of men which in no manner whatever
offend against public order and morality, or injure a third party, are
reserved solely to God and exempt from the authority of the magis-
trates" and that ". . . no inhabitant of the nation shall be compelled
to do what the law does not command nor be deprived of what it does
not prohibit." And Article Fourteen guarantees to all inhabitants the
right to profess freely their religion in accordance with the laws which
regulate its exercise.
Freedom of speech is assured to the inhabitants of Argentina by
Article Fourteen which gives them the right to "publish their ideas
through the press without previous censorship", Article Thirty-two
forbids the federal Congress from enacting laws "which may restrict
the freedom of the press or which may establish federal jurisdiction
over it." The concept of "previous censorship" prohibited by the Con-
stitution is precise and comprehensive. The Supreme Court has held
that this prohibition extends to the revision and examination of the
written word for the purpose of controlling ideas before their publica-
tion as well as to such restrictions as bonds, permits, etc. Also
included in this prohibition are measures punishing or suppressing the
publication once it has appeared. 4
21b. Article Fifteen of the new Constitution prohibits the employment by the
government of any member of a national or international organization which espouses
principles different from the principles of individual liberty recognized by the Consti-
tution. Military organizations not controlled by the state are prohibited. Public
use of uniforms, flags, symbols that characterize those organizations is prohibited.
22. See. e. g., United States Telephone Co. v. Municipalidad de la Capital Federal,
127 C. S. N. 18.
23. 153 C. S. N. 117; 149 C. S. N. 417.
24. Ministerio Fiscal de Santa Fe v. "La Provincia," 40 REv. J L. ARGENTINA 310
(1932).
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However, there should be distinguished two periods in the juris-
prudence of the Argentine Supreme Court. From 1863 to 1932 it
maintained consistently that federal courts had no jurisdiction over
crimes committed by the press. But beginning with the case of
Ministerio Fiscal de Santa Fe v. "La Provinciaf" decided December
23, 1932,25 the Court has held that federal courts have jurisdiction
over these crimes, if there was a violation of those national laws which
tended to insure against violence, to protect the existence of the central
power, and to guarantee the exercise of constitutional powers.
The Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution was
adopted almost literally by the Amending Convention of the Argen-
tine Constitution which met in 1860 as Article Thirty-three.
The writ of habeas corpus was not expressly adopted by the
Argentine Constitution, but Article Eighteen provides that "no one
may be arrested except by virtue of a written order from a competent
authority." According to Argentine jurisprudence the remedy of
habeas corpus will lie only in the case of an undue attack on physical
liberty, even though decisions hold that this remedy applies to all
individual rights which constitute personal liberty. Of late there has
been a growing opinion in support of the constitutional existence of
the remedy of amparo, directed to safeguard from the excesses of
public authority the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution-
with the exception of physical liberty which is protected by habeas
corpus.a' The decisions of the Argentine Supreme Court are confused
on this point, and while decisions on both sides could be cited, the
prevalent view is opposed to the existence of this remedy."8
In the United States, whenever the public safety is endangered by
rebellion or invasion, the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. The
parallel circumstance which will suspend the remedy in Argentina
is the state of siege which may be declared by Congress or by the
Executive with the consent of the Senate in the case of internal dis-
order and in the case of foreign attack.
Although according to the theory of the Constitution this remedy
is exceptional and extraordinary, practically it has been converted into
a normal event by the Congress so frequently has it been used. Since
the constitutional organization of the country, the state of siege has
been declared thirty times, twenty-nine of which were based on in-
25. Ibid.
25a. The new Constitution states that no citizen may be arrested without a written
order from the proper authority, and all citizens have the right to the writ of habeas
corpus to investigate any arrest or threat to individual liberty.
26. Compafiia Sudamericana de Servicios Publicos S. A. v. Comisi6n de Fomento
de Gilvez, 174 C. S. N. 184 (1935) ; J. G. Bertotto v. Jefe de Correos y Teligrafos
de Rosario, 168 C. S. N. 31 (1933) ; In re Bertotto, 160 C. S. N. 113 (1931).
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ternal disorder. Fifteen of these times, it has been declared by execu-
tive decree and fifteen by lawY.2  This frequency becomes all the more
significant if it is borne in mind that there is a substantial suspension
of constitutional guarantees when the state of siege is declared. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has ruled that this state constitutes an
"exceptional status, and consequently the interpretation of the powers
which are granted by it must be done restrictively, especially when,
as in the case of the extent and measure thereof in one of their aspects,
discussion and doubt arise." 28 Contrary to the interpretation prevail-
ing in Argentina at this time, we understand, together with two dis-
tinguished jurists, Joaquin V. Gonz~lez 29 and Juan Carlos Rbora,30
that the state of siege suspends those guarantees of the civil and
political rights only to the extent that they join in repelling foreign
attack or suppressing interior disorder, and the suspension must be
made effective in each individual case by the exercise of the powers
which the state of siege 10a grants to the President, i. e., to arrest or to
transfer the persons from one point of the nation to another if they
should not prefer to depart from Argentine territory. The opposite
interpretation is equivalent to the grant to the executive of the extra-
ordinary powers which Article Twenty-nine of the Constitution
condemns.
Relation of the Federal Government to the States or Provinces
Woodrow Wilson was not mistaken when he stated that the rela-
tions between the central and the local powers constitute the crucial
problem of the political system of the United States,8 and an identical
affirmation can be made with respect to the constitutional structure
of the Argentine Republic. Here it can be said that the very key-
stone of the federal state is this balance between the central govern-
ment and the state governments, neutralizing the constant divergent
actions of centripetal and centrifugal forces which struggle constantly
to obtain supremacy.
Both in the United States and in Argentina, the states or prov-
inces have delegated to the federal government a definite portion of
27. QUINTANA, LA DESNATURALIZACI6 DEL ESTADO DE SITIO ComO INSTRUmENTO
DE SUEVERS16N INsTrrTcIONAL (1946).
28. In re Marcelo T. de Alvear, 167 C. S. N. 317 (1932).
29. GONZALEZ, MANUAL DE LA CONSTIrUCI6N ARGENTINA 250-251 (1897).
30. REBORA, EL ESTADO DE SITIO Y LA RIST6RICA DEL DESBORDE INSTITUCIONAL 267-
268 (1935).
30a. Article Eighty-three, section nineteen of the new Constitution provides that
the Executive, with the knowledge of the Congress, can impose a state of siege in the
event of a civil disturbance which dislocates the peace or the activities of the citizens.
Such a declaration suspends the constitutional guarantees.
31. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 173 (1908).
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power and have reserved the remainder to themselves. In both coun-
tries, the states or provinces possess autonomy or self-government.
It could be said that the federal and provincial or state governments
are independent in their respective spheres. However, the American
states have a fuller measure of autonomy than the Argentine provinces;
and as an illustrative example may be mentioned the power reserved
to the American states to enact their substantive codes--civil, criminal
or commercial-a function which in the Argentine Republic has been
expressly delegated to the federal Congress.sla
In addition, the constitutional clause which authorizes the Argen-
tine federal government to intervene in the territory of the provinces
in a series of situations which it enumerates " has frequently served
so that the executive power has established its political supremacy
in the provinces, frequently with their acquiescence and even at their
request. Almost forty years ago, Matienzo observed: "In a word,
federal intervention is accepted willingly in everything which may con-
tribute to the social and economic growth of the provinces. And in
the political fieldp the federal interference is also accepted with great
pleasure, whenever it benefits the party to which one belongs; and
thus, there is no governor, no legislature, no faction of a provincial
legislature, which does not turn its eyes to the President of the
Republic or to Congress, whenever they feel weak or in danger. Vice
versa, there are no provincial oppositions which do not call him to their
support, to depose or subdue the governor of the province." 33
It is interesting to note that between the final constitutional
organization of the country and the Revolution of June 4, 1943, the
federal government had spent, upon intervening in the provinces, the
sum of $32,071,086.70. Only on forty-seven occasions was the true
constitutional doctrine applied, requiring a law of Congress, while in
ninety-five cases resort was had to the simple and convenient executive
decree. Such interventions have ranged in duration from two days
in the one experienced by Buenos Aires in February 1935 to about
three years in San Juan in 1938."4
31a. To this the new Constitution adds the power to enact aeronautical, sanitary
and social rights codes. Art. 68. And Article Sixty-seven, section sixteen gives the
federal government the power to legislate on matters "conducive to the prosperity,
hygiene, morals, public health and social welfare."
32. This cannot be compared in scope, however, with Article IV of the United
State Constitution.
33. MATIENZo, EL GOBIERNO REPRESENTATIVO FEDERAL EN LA REP6BLICA ARGEN-
TINA 242 (2d ed. 1917).
34. The first place on the list of provinces which have experienced interventions
is occupied by San Juan, with fifteen-four by law and eleven by decree. San Juan
is followed by La Rioja, Corrientes, and Catamarca, with fourteen interventions each
-La Rioja, five by congressional sanction and nine by executive decree; Corrientes,
two by law and twelve by decree; Catamarca, eight by law and six by decree. In
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McChesney Sait has asserted that a federal state and a unitarian
state are not more than steps in a series of biological evolution. The
unitarian state constitutes the beginning and the end of the process.
In an initial step, a unitarian state begins by allying itself with another
state for the purposes of common defense. The second phase is the
confederation which does not destroy the sovereignty of the member
states. In a third step, the federal state is built up in which the
sovereignty of the local states is replaced by autonomy, and in which
there is a balance between the federal powers and the state or provincial
powers. In a subsequent step, upon the breaking up of this balance,
the supremacy of the central government over the local governments
is produced. The last step of the cycle is the return to the unitarian
state, and so on successively. 5 To the examples of the United States,
Germany, and South Africa, which the cited author invokes as
examples of his thesis, the Argentine Republic could be added. In
fact, both in the United States and in Argentina, the states or prov-
inces at the beginning joined in a confederation 8 6 so that later, upon
the adoption of the Constitution, they formed a federal state, with a
balance more or less adequate between the federal and the local powers.
And today, in each country-although with greater intensity in Argen-
tina--one observes the breaking up of that balance and an evident
predominance of the federal government over the state or provincial
governments.
3 7
We do not assert, incidentally, anything new when we indicate
(as already has been more authoritatively done by American specialists
in political science ") the strengthening of the central power at the
expense of state autonomy carried out in the United States. That
centralizing tendency which is observed in almost all the federal states
of the world-United States, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Australia
and Brazil, has not failed to be evidenced also in Argentina, with
Jujuy, the federal remedy was applied eleven times, all by decree. The next position
is occupied, with ten interventions each, by the provinces of Buenos Aires (five by law
and five by decree), Santa Fe (one by law and nine by decree), and Mendoza (three
by law and seven by decree). Of the nine occasions when Tucumin had to undergo
the federal remedies, four were by virtue of law and five by decree. With seven inter-
ventions each are C6rdoba (one by law and six by decree) and San Luis (four by law
and three by decree). The five interventions which Salta has suffered were by legis-
lative decision once and the remaining three times by decree. Entre Rios has been
the province with the fewest interventions, since only on four occasions was there an
intervention, three times by law and once by decree. 1 QUINTANA, GoBIERNO Y
ADmimNsTRAci6N DE LA REPfjBLicA ARGENTINA 46, 47 (1946).
35. SArr, POLITICAL INsTrruTIONS 374 (1932).
36. This was accomplished by the Articles of Confederation in the United States,
and by the Federal Pact of 1831 in Argentina.
37. See QUINTANA, TEORfA Y PR,&CTICA DEL ESTADO FEDERAL 21 (1943).
38. See, e. g., OGG & RAY, INTRODUCTION To AMERI AN GOVERNMENT 59-71 (1945).
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emphasis more or less pronounced than in other countries. Almost
ten years ago Professor Dana Montafio stated, "From some time to the
present, the natural centripetal tendency of the federal system, which is
a universal phenomenon, which consists in the centralization of im-
portant governmental and administrative powers, historically or
juridically exercised before by the entities which make it up, becomes
more aggravated and complicated with the progressive renunciation
of the exercise of powers reserved exclusively to the provinces by the
constitutional instrument; a renunciation of self-government, which is
incompatible with the sentiment and the reality of the provincial per-
sonality. Everything is expected from, everything is attributed to,
everything is abandoned to the action or to the patronage of the
central government. Now it is not only that old practice erected into
doctrine, denounced half a century ago by Estrada, as one of the
sophisms which destroyed the essence of suffrage and interfered with
electoral freedom, a practice which in short originated and developed
in the politico-party field. Now it is the subvention, the subsidy, the
designations, the national law and national decree, the inspiration in
every order and in every and all grounds, the mess of pottage for which
the provinces sell their political birthright in the institutional field." 89
The causes of the growing centralization carried out in Argen-
tina are numerous and complex. On the one hand, the inaction of
provincial governments, generally due to their poor economic and
financial condition, has contributed, as has their lack of initiative and
the expectation of everything from the central power. On the other
hand, the penetrating action of the federal government has been at
work, generally motivated by the necessity of replacing local inertia
in such important fields as primary instruction and social assistance,
as well as the national centralizing force, which, as we have already
indicated, is evidenced in nearly all federal countries, and which is
accentuated by the absence of barriers erected by the provincial gov-
ernments.
The two most powerful instruments of such centralization have
been federal intervention in the provinces and economic and financial
aid from the central power. We have already dwelt on the frequency
with which the powerful remedy of intervention has been applied in
Argentina, to the extent that an institution provided by the con-
stituent members as a last resort, and one of an extraordinary nature,
has been converted into one of normal and current use. Also, in
matters of primary instruction and of taxes, the provinces, by means
39. Montafio, Los Principios fundamentales de la Constitucidn Nacional, in 47
REviSTA DE CONFERENCIAS 31.
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of a system of law agreements, i. e., laws sanctioned by the national
Congress and to which the provinces subsequently subscribe, have been
delegating gradually and increasingly to the central power an im-
portant sum of functions which in reality they reserved to themselves
under the Constitution. It is thus that the provinces have delegated,
by means of these law agreements, to the federal government the col-
lection of internal taxes and the income tax, the receipts from which
are, distributed among the provinces in accordance with a fixed per-
centage. Hence, with the weakening of the economic and financial
autonomy of the provinces, their political autonomy has declined
correspondingly.
40
The creation of the Secretariat of Labor and Security, with the
rank of Ministry and with jurisdiction over the entire country, simul-
taneously with the transformation of the provincial labor departments
into simple delegations of that central body, constitutes another aspect
of the strengthening of the central power at the expense of the prov-
inces. This may be said without failing to recognize the necessity of a
ministry in that field of administration, but delineating its sphere of
action without invading local jurisdiction. In this respect the criterion
recently established by the Argentine Supreme Court delineates the
federal and provincial powers in labor matters. In 1947, that high
tribunal said in Martin y Cia., Ltda. v. J. Erazo,41 that federalism
. ..comports in the order of things the assignation to the prov-
inces of specific authority to legislate in labor matters as it does to
those other matters related to the public order. . . . This authority
is, however, limited by the Constitution, primarily Section Eleven of
Article Sixty-seven, relating to civil and commercial legisla-
tion . "
Emergencies, the Court continued, which endanger social order
constitute proper subject matter for provincial legislation, but such
emergency situations diminish upon the progressive enactment of
national legislation, and a corresponding lessening of the scope of local
power results.
"The second limitation is that which results from the supremacy
of legislation in the matters in respect of which the legislative powers
of the nation and of the provinces are concurrent. Everything which
may be regulated by the provincial legislatures in labor matters may
be done as long as it is not the subject of regulation on the part of the
national Congress, or in case that it has been, in harmony therewith,
since said power arises from what is provided in Article One Hun-
40. See SCHA-ROTH, RESTAuRACioN ImANCmA 5-10 (1941).
41. 48 REv. LA LFY 331, 335-336 (1947).
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dred-seven of the Constitution it is obvious that it is not an exclusive
power but one enjoyed jointly with the national government to which
it is assigned, even in the same language, in Section Sixteen of Article
Sixty-seven. But it is in the natural order that such concurrence, in
the case of legislations which cannot reach their respective finalities
except disposing of the whole in the regulation of a part imposes the
recognition of the supremacy of the legislation of the whole . .
"The third limitation is that which establishes the freedom of in-
terprovincial commerce sanctioned by sub-paragraph nine and twelve
of Article Sixty-seven of the Constitution which reserves expressly
the regulation thereof to the National Congress."
The Federal Government
The principle of the separation of powers of the government ap-
pears as the backbone of both constitutions. However, the draftsmen
of the two instruments show a different criterion in the distribution of
functions between the three departments or branches of the federal
government. There is no doubt that the Convention at Philadelphia
placed Congress in the upper vortex of the federal triangle, to the
point that it has been said with accuracy that the "Congress of the
United States is the central stronghold of the American democracy." 43
Nor is it error to assert that the constituent members at Santa Fe
gave to the Argentine Executive notable preeminence over the other
two federal powers. It is not superfluous to remember that the Father
of the Argentine Constitution, Alberdi, found the solution of all the
international evils in organizing an executive endowed with the fullest
powers when he said to give to the executive all power possible, but
to give it by constitutional means.
The passage of time caused a progressive and slow but sure
decline of the American legislative power, fully evidenced recently in
the La Follette-Monroney Report.44 Along with this weakening of
the legislative body, a strengthening of the administrative power was
observed.
In the Argentine Republic, since the constitutional organization
the political system bore the original sign of the marked executive
preeminence in the play of governmental powers, and time accentuated
42. Article 67, section 11 of the Argentine Constitution authorizes Congress "to
issue civil, commercial, penal and mining codes, without the said codes altering local
jurisdictions, that application corresponding to the federal provincial courts, depending
on whether the things or persons fall within their respective jurisdictions."
"43. GIRAUD, LA CRISE DE LA DEMOCRATIE ET LA RENFORCEMENT DU POJUVOIR EXECU-
TiF 9 (1938).
44. SEN. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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even more this supremacy, diminishing the original rank of Congress.
In this respect it is interesting to remember that in Europe, shortly
before the beginning of the last World War, it was maintained that
the crisis of democratic institutions in which we then lived was due
principally to the weakness of the executive power, and as a probable
remedy the strengthening of that department of the government was
advocated. In sharp contrast with this fact it was noted that, on the
contrary in Latin America, the authority of the President is clear and
unequivocal, going to the point of designating as "democratic dictator-
ship" the presidential system in these Latin American countries.
The development of the Argentine executive power is traceable
from the Spanish monarchy as evidenced in the viceroy of the colonial
period, through the supreme director established in 1814, the gov-
ernors of the provinces, and the pathological and anti-democratic de-
velopment of the system under the tyrant Rosas. The theory of the
unipersonal "strong" executive was set forth and systematized by
Alberdi who believed that here was one place where the Spanish-
Argentine Constitution must depart from the model of the United
States.45
We believe that the Argentine constituent members magnified
the role which belongs to the President in the constitutional plan
which they elaborated, and that the practice unbalanced even more
the relation of the former with the other powers of the government,
particularly with Congress.45 It has been said that the Argentine
people of today differs so completely from the people of the pre-
constitutional era-economically, socially, politically, and racially-
that it is an absurdity to maintain the Executive in the preponderant
position then given him because of the difficult circumstances and al-
most insuperable obstacles which were faced in effecting national or-
ganization. The political doctrine has been designated as "anachro-
nistic and anti-republican, repugnant to the progressive develop-
ment of a modern nation." "
It must be admitted on the other hand that the strengthening
of the executive in general has been facilitated and stimulated by the
weak action of Congress in the defense of its sphere of action and
of its constitutional prerogratives, due, among other causes, to the
fact that almost always the President has been a member of the po-
litical party which had a majority in the legislative branch, and many
times party solidarity was more potent than the defense of the par-
45. ALBERDI, Op. cit. stpra note 5, c. xxv.
45a. The new Constitution further strengthens the power of the Executive. See
note 30a supra. And see Arts. 78, 83 § 11, 67 § 10, 83 § 13, 68 § 7, 64.
46. CAL;DER6x, DEREcHo CONSTiTuCIoAL 286 (1931).
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liamentary body. Precisely, the Buenos Aires newspaper, "La
Nacion," stated on August 11, 1940: "The facts reveal that Congress
is planning its own ruin in consenting to the usurpation of its privi-
leges by the Executive Power. Not only does it fail to stop the ad-
vance, but it does not adopt measures designed to avoid it in the
future. In its indifference toward the alteration of the constitutional
balance, the chambers are permitting themselves to be despoiled even
of the traditional prerogatives of parliaments.. .
Also, for some considerable time, there has been manifested a
growing tendency to govern by means of decrees, which in many cases
have replaced legislative action.
Consequently, the opinion expressed by Professor MacDonald,
is not exaggerated, that "In the scheme of Argentine political life
[the President] is more important than Congress or the courts, or
the two combined. His authority is greater than that of the presi-
dent of the United States, or of the chiefs of state of most democratic
nations." '7
The Supreme Court-considered properly as that characteristic
of the American constitutional system which distinguishes it from
the other modern political systems 4 --was adopted by the Argentine
Convention, erecting it as the guardian and final and definitive in-
terpreter of the Constitution. The importance which the Court has
had in Argentine constitutional history has been extraordinary. It
has been asserted that ". . . many pages of [the Constitution] find
their true sense and their highest meaning through the decisions of
the Court, and of the teachings which they imply," 4 and that "the
true Constitution of the Republic is that which springs from the
interpretation which has been given to it in one thousand decisions
of the Supreme Court of Justice." 50
It has been objected that "ordinarily the Court seems rather like
a superior tribunal, with functions similar to those of other justice
tribunals, and only in exceptional occasions does it assume the exer-
cise of its great power to establish the constitutional interpretation
which is expected of it. Its varied jurisprudence concerning the so-
called extraordinary remedy, established by Article 14 of Law No. 48,
demonstrates, aside from the incongruity which characterizes the
former, the tendency of the Court to evade the examination of any
47. MAcDONALD, GOVERNMENT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 190 (1942).
48. See HAYNES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERIcAN GOVERNMENT
AND PouTCs 3 (1944).
49. GALLO, PR6LOGO A FELIPE S. PLEz, TRATADO SOBE LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE
LA CORTE SUPREMA 14.
50. Id. at 24.
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constitutional question which may compromise it before public opin-
ion." r1 It has also been said that attacks on the institutional order
by means formerly unknown-brought about by social transforma-
tions, new methods of commerce, and the complications inherent in
the changes of international exchange-do not succeed with the fre-
quency that is necessary to effect its ascendancy; that it makes its
strength consist in its immutability." The Court has also been criti-
cized because its judgments sometimes indicate that all solutions must
be extracted from the express or implied intent of the legislature as
opposed to the principles of constitutional interpretation employed in
the United States.5"
Despite the criticism and objections that the work of the highest
Argentine tribunal may deserve, we cannot fail to recognize that its
constant homogeneity and unity has prevented the lowering of the
high esteem in which it is held. Its jurisprudence must be seen, by
reason thereof, as a firm and sure development; the expression of wis-
dom and maturity and not of improvisation. And this observation
applies to the Court subsequent to its renovation, effected by the polit-
ical persecution of several of its members, since, in spite of the almost
complete modification of its membership, one cannot point out a funda-
mental departure from the principles established by the jurisprudence
of the previous Court. Realizing that the Supreme Court is not in
an atmosphere propitious for innovations, one may recall Bielsa, who
considers as of the essence of that institution its conservative func-
tion in the juridical order in the institutional-jurisdictional sphere.5 4
REVOLUTION AND THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE
Not always do governments succeed each other regularly in the
course of time in accordance with the procedure regulated by the
Constitution, but rather on certain occasions revolution puts in power
a de facto government. In the United States, from the adoption of the
Constitution until the present time, governments have succeeded each
other regularly without there having occurred any government of such
a nature. On the other hand, in the Argentine Republic, on various
occasions, revolutions have given rise to such de facto governments.
51. 3 CALDE6x, op. cit. supra note 46, at 447.
52. ZAVALfA, HiswmrA DE LA CoaRa SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA 11 (1920).
53. Justo, La interpretacion de la ley a prop6sito de tn tratado sobre jurispruden-
cia de la Corte Suprema, BoLETfx DE LA BIDLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIOxAL 1023
(1941).
54. BIELSA, LA PmoTccI6N coNsTrTucioAL Y EL REcuJSo ExTRmoauinmo 113
(1936).
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As a result, the Supreme Court has established during the course of
the years a series of principles, the systematization of which consti-
tutes an entire de facto doctrine.
Revolution of 1861
The first jurisprudential case arose upon the fall of the govern-
ment of the Confederation at the Battle of Pav6n, on September 18,
1861. Mitre, who successfully headed the movement against the au-
thorities, was entrusted by the provinces with the foreign relations of
the Republic, and to perform them within the constitutional limits
of the national executive until Congress might convene and enact
legislation as was provided by law for that purpose. Upon the cancel-
lation by General Mitre of payments made to the customs of Rosario,
the private citizens affected initiated a judicial proceeding which
reached the Supreme Court. The Court held in Baldomero Martinez
y Manuel Otero, 5 that as Governor of Buenos Aires and General in
Charge of its armies, Mitre was competent to decide such matters
since it was he who provisionally exercised all national powers by
virtue of the victory of Pav6n and by the assent of the people.
Revolution of 1930
The Revolution of September 6, 1930, having been successful,
the Supreme Court met in extraordinary session, to take into con-
sideration a communication addressed by the President of the pro-
visional Executive Power, Lieutenant General Jos6 F. Uriburu, in-
forming the tribunal of the establishment of a de facto government.
The Court then subscribed to a decision in which it said:
The provisional government which has just been estab-
lished in the country, is, then, a de facto government the title
of which cannot be judicially disputed with success by persons
in so far as it carries out the administrative and political func-
tion derived from the possession of force as an instrument of
order and social security. Notwithstanding that, if, once the
situation becomes normal, in the development of the action of
the de facto government, the officers who make it up should ig-
nore the individual guarantees or those of property or others
secured by the Constitution, the Administration of Justice charged
with making the form that be complied with, would restore them
in the same conditions and to the same extent that it would have
done with the legal executive power. And this last conclusion,
imposed by the very organization of the judicial power, is con-
55. 2 C. S. N. 290 (1865).
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firmed by the declarations of the provisional government, which,
in assuming charge has hastened to give oath to comply with and
to cause to be complied with the Constitution and the funda-
mental laws of the nation, a decision which implies the conse-
quence that it is ready to . . . render the aid of the force which
it possesses to obtain compliance with judicial judgments. 6
In the controversy produced by the pardon granted the ex-Presi-
dent Hip6lito Irigoyen, the Court said that it mattered not that the
pardon sub lite may have been decreed by the de facto Executive Power
since the provisional government had been able to use the constitu-
tional powers of the legal Executive Power, having submitted in the
exercise thereof to the constitutional provisions and the decisions of
justice.57
This principle was reiterated in the case of Administraci6n de
Impuestos Internos v. M. Malmonge Nebreda,5" where it was said
that the provisional President held the same powers as those granted
the legal President by Article Eighty-six of the Constitution. Further,
it was set forth that the de facto government possessed executive but
not legislative or judicial powers, for to allow such a situation would
leave to the will of a single person the most delicate and gravest
interests of the state, including those guarantees of individual liberties.
However, it was recognized that a case might arise where the pro-
visional government, in the absence of a Congress, faced with an
extraordinary situation might exercise legislative powers by means of
Decree Laws; such to be given legal sanction only within the abnormal-
ity of the situation.
Revolution of 1943
Upon the outbreak of the revolutionary movement of June 4,
1943, the provisional Executive Power, General Ramirez, made known
to the Court the formation of a provisional government. Citing its
decision of 1930, the Court again issued a decree recognizing the de
facto administration. 59
On April 2, 1945, the Court, confirming its previous jurispru-
dence, established certain basic principles. Having convened to con-
sider a note from the de facto Executive Power which communicated
56. 158 C. S. N. 290 (1930).
57. 165 C. S. N. 213 (1932).
58. 172 C. S. N. 365 (1935); accord, C. Zavalia v. Caja de Jubilaciones de Em-
pleados Civiles, 184 C. S. N. 589 (1939) ; M. Escalada v. Caja Nacional de Jubilaci-
ones, 179 C. S. N. 409 (1937); S. Toranzo v. Gobierno Nacional, 178 C. S. N. 377
(1937) ; A. Avellaneda Huergo v. Gobierno Nacional, 172 C. S. N. 365 (1935).
59. 196 C. S. N. 5 (1943).
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the Executive's decree appointing Dr. Fernando Dupuy to the Chamber
of Appeals of the North, the high tribunal decided not to administer
the oath to the magistrate. In his opinion, Judge Repetto said:
Article Ninety-four of the National Constitution and sub-
paragraph seventeen of Article Sixty-seven provide in a cate-
gorical manner that the judicial power shall be exercised by
one Supreme Court of Justice and by the other inferior tribunals
which the Congress should establish in the territory of the
Nation. But paragraphs twenty-seven and fourteen, in turn, at-
tribute to Congress, as the local legislature for the capital and the
national territories, exclusive jurisdiction for the creation of tri-
bunals of this type.
The Executive Power, de facto, bound himself by oath
to comply with the Constitution, and consequently, he could not
issue decree No. 4,256, creating a Chamber of Justice in the na-
tional territories, inasmuch as, on the one part, the subject mat-
ter of the decree is not included in any of the purposes .declared
by the resolution of June 4, and, on the other, it would lack the
double character of urgency and necessity indispensable so that
the Executive Power de facto, may exercise, under the guise of
an exception, power which the Constitution assigns expressly to
the Congress of the Nation."0
On the same date, the Court, by reason of a decree of the de facto
Executive Power which transferred the federal judge of Santa Fe to
San Rafael-that is to say from one province to another-declared that
the transfer violated the constitutional guarantee of non-removability
of judges."1
But it was in the case of Municipalidad de la Capital v. Carlos
M. Mayer,2 decided on the same day as the preceding ones, that the
Supreme Court stated more extensively the basis of its de facto doc-
trine. In this suit the unconstitutionality of the Decree Law issued
by the de facto Executive Power on July 6, 1944, which modified Law
No. 189 concerning expropriation by reason of public use (eminent
domain) was sought, and in the decision rendered the next day, the
Court said:
It was thus that a de facto government was formed
under the form of the Executive Power of the Constitution,
which, even though it could have by reason of the force which
supported it, abrogated the Constitution and issued its own statute,
limited itself to unseat the Executive Power and to dissolve the
Legislative Power, swearing to comply with the Constitution,
and maintain the functioning of the Judicial Power constitution-
60. 38 REv. LA LEY 51 (1945).
61. 38 REv. LA LEY 53 (1945).
62. 38 RFv. LA LEY 87, 90 (1945).
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ally organized. By reason thereof, the Court, in the perform-
ance of an inescapable duty and before the necessity that the
country should continue its course under the protection of con-
stitutional rights and guarantees, continued to act in the fullness
of its functions, without declining any of its powers, or assum-
ing others than those which corresponded to it constitutionally.
The survival of the Constitution and the continuation of
its Judicial Power of constitutional origin are facts pregnant
with consequences which cannot be lost sight of and of funda-
mental and decisive importance to decide the questions of the
nature raised in this suit. It is indisputable that the de facto
Government has all the powers which the National Constitution
grants to the constitutional Executive Power, and the Court has
so ruled in previous cases (Judgments: Vol. 165, p. 199; Vol.
169, p. 309; Vol. 178, p. 377). It is indisputable, also that he
cannot exercise judicial functions, usurp the cognizance of pend-
ing cases, or reestablish those which have lapsed. The contrary
would be to grant to the de facto government extraordinary
powers and those who would consent thereto would incur the
condemnation of Article Twenty-nine of the Constitution.
The Court added that the question relating to the exercise of legis-
lative powers by the de facto Executive Power would be more com-
plex:
The Legislative Power which it (the Constitution) creates
is the genuine representative of the people and its character as a
collegiate body is the fundamental guarantee for the real interpre-
tation of the general will. The de facto government is uni-
personal, lacks popular representation, and if it maintains the
Constitution in force, the restoration of which it proposes accord-
ing to well known declarations, is a temporary government, be-
tween two constitutional governments. However, the necessity
of the imposition of the facts makes inescapable to it the exercise
of legislative powers which may be indispensable to it to main-
tain the freedom of the state and to perform the purposes of the
revolution; the contrary would lead to chaos and anarchy. But
these powers must be limited, carrying to an indispensable mini-
mum the abrogation of the representative principle. The neces-
sity of guarding judicial security, and of preserving the system of
the fundamental rights of civil life require it, just as they have
been organized by the national representation. To recognize in
one man or in a group of men ample legislative powers is in-
compatible with the enforcement of the Constitution. Also in
point of time, the legislative powers of the government have a
limit. Once the country has returned to normalcy, the provisions
of such a character cease to have effect in the future, except if
ratified by Congress, its previous existence having been effective
with relation to accomplished facts. This is, on the other hand,
the doctrine which arises from the judgments of the Court.
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Systemization of the De Facto Doctrine of the Argentine
Supreme Court
The de facto doctrine which has resulted from the systemization
of the jurisprudence of the Argentine Supreme Court, may be syn-
thesized into the following principles: "
(A) The de facto government does not suspend the effective
force of the Constitution, since it is a statute to regulate and guaran-
tee the rights of the men who live in the Republic, in time of peace
as in time of war, and its provisions could not be suspended in any
of the great emergencies of a financial character or of another nature
in which the governments might find themselves; "'
(B) The de facto government possesses the powers which the
Constitution confers on the executive power, inasmuch as it is a
"government de facto under the form of the Executive Power of the
Constitution, which, even though it could have by reason of the power
which supported it, abrogated the Constitution and issued its own
statute, limited itself to unseat the Executive Power and to dissolve
the Legislative Power, swearing to comply with the Constitution and
maintain the functioning of the Judicial Power constitutionally or-
ganized" ; "r
(C) The de facto government has the same powers as the
de jure government, never greater, inasmuch as "if the force of neces-
sity requires that the same powers may be acknowledged in the de
facto official as in the legal one, nothing justifies that greater ones be
attributed to him"; 66
(D) The de facto government "cannot exercise judicial func-
tions, assume the cognizance of pending cases or restore those which
lapsed"; 67
(E) The de facto government is subject to the control of the
Judicial Power; 68
63. In setting forth the jurisprudence of the Argentine Supreme Court, the term
de facto government is used in the sense in which the Supreme Court uses it. It should
be noted, however, that we consider this term inadequate, since in reality we should
speak of the de facto executive power.
64. Compafiia Azucarera Tucumana v. Prov. de Tucumin, 26 REv. Jun. ARGEN-
TINA 903 (1927).
65. Municipalidad de la Capital v. Carlos M. Mayer, 38 REv. LA LEY 87, 90
(1945).
66. Administraci6n de Impuestos Internos v. M. Malmonge Nebreda, 165 C. S. N.
365 (1933).
67. Municipalidad de la Capital v. Carlos M. Mayer, 38 Rtv. LA LEY 87, 90
(1945).
68. Ibid.
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(F) In principle, the de facto government lacks legislative
powers, but exceptionally the necessity of the occasion may justify
their exercise when indispensable to the maintenance of the state, 9
as would be those provisions of a fiscal nature made necessary by
the progress of the nation and those which would answer other neces-
sities of an urgent nature--a rule which requires that the measure
possess the double character of urgency and necessity; 7' also, when-
ever they are indispensable to carrying out the purposes of the revolu-
tion,72 such as laws of an electoral character or those meant to improve
the social conditions of the working classes,7 this having been estab-
lished as the express purpose of the revolution.
(G) The exercise of these legislative powers is further limited
inasmuch as: (1) the abrogation of the representative principle must
be held to an absolute minimum; 74 (2) individual rights and guaran-
tees must not be adversely affected; (3) once there is a return to
normalcy such provisions cease to have effect unless ratified by Con-
gress; 71 and (4) the power is not extended to the establishing of
crimes and penalties or to increasing existing penalties, or modifying
the penal code then in force.
76
(H) The de facto government is unipersonal, lacks popular rep-
resentation and if it retains in force the Constitution, it is a temporary
government, between two constitutional governments.
77
A fundamental change in the make-up of the Supreme Court,
caused by the retirement of its President and the removal through
political action of three other members is reflected in the one im-
portant inodification of the principles previously set forth in the de
facto doctrine. Thus, in the case of Enrique Arlazdini,78 the Court
said, ". . . that to the extent in which it is necessary to legislate
in order to govern, a de facto government has legislative powers, with-
out the determination of that necessity . . . being subject to judicial
revision. What continues to be subject to said revision by means
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 93 (concurring opinion).
71. 38 REv. LA LEY 51, 52 (1945).
72. Municipalidad de la Capital v. Carlos M. Mayer, 38 Rav. LA LEY 87, 90
(1945).
73. Id. at 93 (concurring opinion).
74. Id. at 90.
75. Id. at 90.
76. Carlos Anders y otros, 42 REv. LA LEY 21 (1946).
77. Municipalidad de la Capital v. Carlos M. Mayer, 38 Rlv. LA LEY 87, 90
(1945).
78. 47 R v. LA LE:Y 802, 803 (1947).
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of the remedy of unconstitutionality is the basis or contents of the
legislative sanctions of the de facto governments as well as those which
arise from those legally established."
On October 1, 1947, in the case of Ziella v. Smiriglio Hnos,79 the
same tribunal decreed, ". . . that the decree-laws issued by the de
facto government are valued by reason of their origin and since they
have the force of law they continue in force even though they have
not been ratified by Congress as long as they are not repealed in the
only manner in which they may be so, that is to say, by other laws."
These new principles modifying those previously set forth, have al-
ready been ratified in numerous subsequent cases.
79. 48 REv. LA LEY 361 (1947).
